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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Dialysis decisions concerning cognitively 
impaired adults: a scoping literature review
Jordan A. Parsons* and Jonathan Ives
Abstract 
Background: Chronic kidney disease is a significant cause of global deaths. Those who progress to end-stage kidney 
disease often commence dialysis as a life-extending treatment. For cognitively impaired patients, the decision as 
to whether they commence dialysis will fall to someone else. This scoping review was conducted to map existing 
literature pertaining to how decisions about dialysis are and should be made with, for, and on behalf of adult patients 
who lack decision-making capacity. In doing so, it forms the basis of a larger body of work that is exploring how these 
decisions ought to be made.
Methods: To identify relevant papers, searches were conducted on Ovid MEDLINE(R), Embase, PsychINFO, The 
Cochrane Library, and Web of Science. Inclusion criteria were then applied, requiring that papers: report on empirical 
studies about how decisions about dialysis are made and/or discuss how decisions about dialysis should be made 
with, for, and on behalf of adult patients who lack decision-making capacity; be published from 1961 onwards; and be 
published in English. This resulted in 27 papers eligible for inclusion.
Results: Of note, the majority of papers originated in the United States. There was wide variation across the included 
papers. Extracted data were grouped under the following themes: involving various parties (patient involvement, 
family dominance, and wider communication); objectivity about care options (including difficulties with family 
detachment); cultural sensitivity; medical versus non-medical factors; managing nonadherent patients; and the role 
and prevalence of substituted judgement. The literature shows that there is inconsistency in the principles and pro-
cesses surrounding decisions made about dialysis with, for, and on behalf of adult patients who lack decision-making 
capacity.
Conclusions: This scoping review demonstrates that there is significant variation in both the practice and theory of 
dialysis decision making with, for, and on behalf of cognitively impaired adult patients. Complexity arises in consider-
ing who should get a say, how influential their say should be in a decision, and what factors are most relevant to the 
decision. A lack of up-to-date literature exploring this issue is highlighted, with this scoping review providing a useful 
groundwork from which further research can be undertaken.
Keywords: Chronic kidney disease, Cognitive impairment, Dementia, Dialysis, Kidney failure, Mental Capacity Act 
2005
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Background
End stage kidney disease (ESKD, or kidney failure) 
affects a significant proportion of the world’s population. 
Chronic kidney disease (the precursor to ESKD) rose 
from being the 27th highest cause of global deaths in 
1990 to 18th in 2010 in the Global Burden of Disease 
study (p. 2113) [1]. Several options exist for the care of 
patients with or approaching ESKD, including transplan-
tation, dialysis, and conservative kidney management 
(CKM). When transplantation is an option but cannot 
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happen immediately, dialysis often acts as a bridge ther-
apy. When transplantation is not an option, the decision 
must be made as to whether to dialyze the patient at all. 
If yes, the patient will receive a whole package of care 
including dialysis. If not, the patient will receive CKM, 
which is a similar care plan only without dialysis. As 
such, many patients with ESKD find themselves on dialy-
sis at some point. Of these, a not insignificant proportion 
contemporaneously suffer cognitive impairment [2]. This 
is, in part, due to an ageing population, as ESKD is often 
reached in later life. In addition, vascular comorbidities 
have been found to be a major contributing factor to cog-
nitive decline [3, 4].
Patients with decision-making capacity in relation to 
dialysis may choose to forego dialysis in favour of CKM, 
for reasons that often relate to the relationship between 
quality of life and the burden of dialysis. One study 
reported patients choosing to forego dialysis because of 
its ‘arduous nature’ and related practical reasons such as 
attending the hospital three times each week [5]. Assum-
ing these decisions are informed and voluntary, they 
seem to be valid reasons why a patient with or approach-
ing ESKD might not want to commence dialysis. Others 
will make different decisions about the balance of ben-
efits and burdens, based on different life goals which, 
accepting the need to respect autonomy, are equally 
legitimate. That being the case, it seems very likely that 
among patients who lack the necessary decision-making 
capacity there will be a range of personal contexts, views, 
and preferences that would, in the absence of cognitive 
impairment, lead to a range of different decisions about 
dialysis being made.
Given that, it is important to reflect on how dialysis 
decisions should be made with, for, and on behalf of per-
sons who lack capacity. This paper reports the first (map-
ping [6]) stage in a larger project exploring how decisions 
about maintenance dialysis ought to be made when the 
patient is cognitively impaired, within the context of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) in England and 
Wales. This first stage aimed to map what is currently 
known about how and why decisions about maintenance 
dialysis are made for persons lacking capacity, with a 
view to informing the later normative work. The focus 
is on adults (18 +), as the MCA 2005 does not apply to 
minors.1 Under the MCA 2005, in the absence of a for-
mally appointed surrogate decision maker, section  1(5) 
requires that a decision be made in the patient’s ‘best 
interests’. Section 4 of the MCA 2005 provides a check-
list of factors to consider in determining the patient’s best 
interests, though is argued by some to be merely enu-
merative and to lack sufficient guidance on the weighting 
of these considerations [7]. Nonetheless, the MCA 2005 
best interests approach is framed as being distinct from 
a substituted judgement approach. Whereas substituted 
judgement requires the substitute decision maker to 
ascertain and make the decision the patient would have 
made if capacitous, best interests decisions, in theory 
at least, require the decision maker only to consider the 
decision the patient would have made among several fac-
tors, and to actually make the decision that best accords 
with the patient’s previously expressed values and beliefs. 
Essentially, a best interests decision is to be the best deci-
sion that the patient could make, not necessarily the deci-
sion they would have made.2
Methods
The project team (JAP and JI) utilised the five key stages 
of Arksey and O’Malley’s six stage process for scoping 
reviews: (1) identifying the research question; (2) iden-
tifying relevant papers3; (3) paper selection; (4) charting 
the data; and (5) collating, summarizing, and reporting 
the results [8]. The sixth stage—consultation with practi-
tioners/consumers—is an optional stage. As this scoping 
review is part of a larger project, the sixth stage will be 
carried out later in the project.
Stage 1: identifying the research question
The research question was initially developed by JAP fol-
lowing informal discussions with several nephrologists 
and ethicists and finalised in conjunction with JI. The pri-
mary research question settled on was ‘What is known 
and theorised about how decisions about maintenance 
dialysis are and should be made with, for, and on behalf 
of adult patients who lack decision-making capacity?’. In 
answering this question, this scoping review maps evi-
dence pertaining to three secondary research questions: 
(1) how are decisions about maintenance dialysis for 
adult patients who lack decision-making capacity made 
in practice?; (2) how do different stakeholders under-
stand the process of making decisions about maintenance 
dialysis for adult patients who lack decision-making 
capacity?; and (3) what normative arguments exist con-
cerning how decisions about maintenance dialysis should 
1 Some aspects of the MCA 2005 apply to those aged 16 and 17, but other leg-
islation also applies for such patients—notably, the Children Act 1989.
2 Indeed, Explanatory Note 28 of the MCA 2005 explicitly states that best 
interests is not a test of substituted judgement, but is an ‘objective test as to 
what would be in the person’s best interests’.
3 Arksey and O’Malley use the term “studies” rather than “papers”. We spe-
cifically use “papers” as it is more inclusive; not all records included in this 
review are “studies”. Nonetheless, in our later discussion we do refer to stud-
ies where appropriate.
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be made with, for, and on behalf of adult patients who 
lack decision-making capacity?
Stage 2: identifying relevant papers
Relevant papers were identified by searching several 
research databases. A preliminary search was carried 
out in February 2020 by JAP using Ovid Medline. This 
search was conducted with reference to the research 
questions already detailed, and with assistance from a 
medical librarian. The purpose of this search was to iden-
tify search terms, abbreviations, and Medical Subject 
Headings (MeSH) terms used frequently in the area with 
which the research questions are concerned. Following 
this search, the final search string was decided on (see 
Table 1).4
Using this search string, the final search was carried out 
on 3rd March 2020 on five databases: Ovid MEDLINE(R), 
Embase, PsychINFO, The Cochrane Library, and Web of 
Science. These databases were selected based on their 
indexing of relevant journals. All databases were searched 
from 1961 (when maintenance dialysis was introduced in 
the UK) to the day of the search.5
Ancillary search strategies
In addition to online searches, the reference lists of 
papers included following the application of inclusion 
and exclusion criteria (see below) were hand searched 
for additional potentially relevant papers. Papers on ref-
erence lists were considered for relevance based on their 
titles, and those deemed likely to be suitable for inclusion 
were screened in full.
Stage 3: paper selection
Once papers were identified as per Stage 2, they were 
subjected to a screening process to determine which 
papers would be included (see Fig. 1). Initially, all dupli-
cate papers were removed. The titles and abstracts of 
all remaining papers were then screened by the first 
reviewer (JAP) according to pre-specified inclusion and 
exclusion criteria and classified as “include”, “exclude”, 
or “unsure”. The inclusion and exclusion criteria were as 
follows:
Inclusion:
• Papers, books, book chapters.
• Papers that report on empirical studies about how 
decisions about dialysis are made with, for, and on 
behalf of adult patients who lack decision-making 
capacity (this does not have to be the primary focus 
of the paper).
• Papers that discuss how decisions about dialy-
sis should be made with, for, and on behalf of adult 
patients who lack decision-making capacity (this 
does not have to be the primary focus of the paper).
• Papers published since 1961 (the year in which main-
tenance dialysis was introduced in the UK).
• Papers published in English.
Exclusion:
• Grey literature, including journalism.
• Case reports.
• Papers not situated in renal care.
• Papers about paediatric or neonatal renal care.
• Papers that do not reference best interests or lack of 
capacity.
• Papers not in English.
A random sample of 10% of the “include” and “exclude” 
lists, as well as all of those classified as “unsure”, were 
Table 1 Final search string
Facet 1 Facet 2 Facet 3
exp Decision Making (MeSH)
OR



























4 There is some variation in the MeSH terms used by each database, so this 
search string was altered slightly when necessary.
5 Some databases did not return results up to the day of the search as they 
update their records on a weekly basis. The databases which did not return 
papers published up to and including the day of the search were PsychINFO 
(up to and including February week 4, 2020) and Embase (up to and includ-
ing week 9, 2020).
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screened by a second reviewer (JI). Whilst there was 
initial agreement on the classification of most papers, 
there were some discrepancies that necessitated discus-
sion. Had discussions not resolved disagreements, a third 
reviewer would have reviewed the paper(s) in question 
and the majority decision carried; this did not prove nec-
essary. Several papers did not have an abstract or had 
an abstract which did not allow for a decision as to its 
inclusion or exclusion to be made confidently. To ensure 
an accurate decision, the full texts of these papers were 
screened against the inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Following discussion with the second reviewer, papers 
on the “include” list, as well as those with no/unclear 
abstracts, were screened in full against the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. 14 papers were excluded at this point, 
including one which could not be accessed (despite all 
reasonable efforts being made) [9]. 24 papers were identi-
fied as fitting the inclusion criteria and were included in 
the review.
Following the selection of included papers, the titles 
in all reference lists were screened to identify further 
papers that might have fitted the inclusion criteria. The 
screening process outlined above was then repeated for 
all additional papers identified in this way. Only three 
papers were found this way that were deemed suitable for 
inclusion.6
The final list of papers deemed to fit the inclusion cri-
teria was then compiled for data extraction. This list 
totalled 27 papers (24 from database searches and three 
from ancillary searching), comprising a mixture of empir-
ical and normative work.
Stage 4: charting the data
Once a final list of papers to include was compiled, each 
was read through twice by the first reviewer (JAP), and 
data extracted on the second reading. The data were 
charted using Microsoft Excel based on the following 
paper characteristics:
 i. Paper (author(s) and year of publication)
 ii. Country of origin
 iii. Aim(s) of paper
 iv. Method(s)/study type
 v. Results
 vi. Reflections from reviewer7
Fig. 1 PRISMA diagram of paper identification
6 One of these three papers - Cady [36] -  was not strictly found in the refer-
ence list of an already included paper. One of the already included papers was 
a commentary on it and mentioned it but did not directly reference it.
7 Under this heading, initial thoughts on codes were noted.
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To aid reliability, the second reviewer (JI) reviewed a 
sample of 10% of the papers.
Stage 5: collating, summarizing, and reporting the results
An inductive, data-driven approach to analysing the 
charted data was taken, employing thematic analy-
sis [10]. Thematic analysis is used for ‘analysing and 
reporting patterns’ (p. 79) in data [10], which are then 
described ‘in words rather than numbers’ (p. 380) [11]. 
As such, any language indicative of frequency ought not 
to be taken as a representation of significance. The data 
were not quantitatively analysed, and such language is 
used merely to provide a sense of those views and find-
ings that were more or less prevalent in the papers.
Broadly, six main themes were identified: “involv-
ing various parties”; “objectivity”; “cultural sensitivity”; 
“medical versus non-medical factors”; “managing non-
adherent patients”; and “substituted judgement”. Dis-
crete sub-themes were developed within each broad 
theme—all of which are detailed in the next section.
Results
Before detailing the results of this review, it is worth 
briefly noting the geography of the included papers. 
The wider concern of this project is with best inter-
ests as per the MCA 2005. Of note, however, very few 
included papers originated in England and Wales (or the 
wider UK). As demonstrated by Table  2, only five of 27 
papers originated in the UK (of these, one was an inter-
national collaboration, and another concerned an Aus-
tralian case). The US, on the other hand, accounted for 
16 papers. This must be taken into account when reading 
Table 2 Countries of origin of included papers
Totals: Singapore (n = 1) | New Zealand (n = 1) | France (n = 1) | Germany (n = 1) | Japan (n = 1) | Australia (n = 4) | Canada (n = 5) | United Kingdom (n = 5) | United 
States (n = 16)
Paper Country/ies
Ang et al. [22] Singapore
Brennan et al. [13] Australia, Canada, United States, and United King-
dom
Cady [36] United States
Campbell et al. [32] United States
Clement et al. [21] France
Conneen et al. [15] United States
Davison and Holley [34] Canada
DeCamp [23] United States
Feely et al. [12] United States
Foote et al. [25] Australia and New Zealand
Grubb [38] United Kingdom
Jones and McCullough [28] United States
Kaye and Lella [16] Canada
Keating et al. [17] United States
MacPhail et al. [14] Australia
McDougall [24] United Kingdom (concerning an Australian case)
Moss et al. [27] United States
Munoz Silva and Kjellstrand [29] United States
O’Dowd et al. [30] United States
O’Rourke et al. [37] United Kingdom
Perkins [26] United States
Pruchno et al. [18] United States
Scott et al. [20] United Kingdom
Sehgal et al. [35] United States, Germany, and Japan
Spike [33] United States
Spike [19] United States
Ying et al. [31] Canada
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the results, as a range of jurisdictions are represented and 
perspectives from the US represent the simple majority 
of papers.
Between these jurisdictions there are likely to be both 
significant and nuanced differences in the prevailing 
social and cultural values and norms that inform medical 
decision making, legislative frameworks, and how health-
care systems operate. This variation will inevitably affect 
how decisions are made with, for, and on behalf of adult 
patients who lack decision-making capacity, as such deci-
sions are embedded within the systems in which they are 
made. As we will come to discuss, the concept of atom-
istic autonomy is more highly valued in some countries 
than in others, with some favouring a more communitar-
ian approach—and this will be reflected in both the way 
that decisions are intuitively made and by the legislative, 
institutional, and professional frameworks within which 
such decisions have to be made. Even within a single 
country, of course, there will be cultural variation that 
can affect perceptions of the decision-making process in 
a healthcare setting. This latter issue will be highlighted 
as a minor, but nonetheless important, theme arising 
from the literature. Equally, the structure of healthcare 
systems is likely to play an important role, with some of 
the represented jurisdictions operating insurance-based 
healthcare and others operating some form of publicly 
funded system. This kind of difference, again, may explain 
variation in the way that decisions are made with, for, and 
on behalf of persons who lack decision-making capacity, 
even when prevailing values are shared. Whilst our aim 
in this paper is not to undertake comparative analysis of 
this kind, we will consider this as and when it becomes 
relevant to the discussion.
Involving various parties
Perhaps the most prominent theme from the literature is 
the complexity of these decisions in terms of which par-
ties are and/or ought to be involved. When the patient is 
unable to make an autonomous decision about their own 
care, who should be involved in making the decision for 
them—and especially what balance of influence is appro-
priate—is not straightforward. The primary focus of the 
literature in this regard is the role of cognitively impaired 
patients themselves and those close to them. However, 
there is also some discussion of interaction between pro-
fessionals involved in the care of such patients.
Involving the patient
Even where the patient lacks the necessary mental capac-
ity for dialysis decisions, the value of that patient being 
involved in decisions about their own care is highlighted. 
This is, in general, framed in terms of recognising the 
importance of patient autonomy, even though such 
patients would not be deemed capable of autonomous 
choice. Some papers consider a duty on nephrologists 
to prepare for situations in which a patient has lost deci-
sion-making capacity. However, it is noted that patient 
wishes are often unclear [12].
First, Brennan and colleagues note that dementia does 
not necessarily mean a patient lacks decision-making 
capacity [13], which reflects the principles of the MCA 
2005. They argue that where capacity is uncertain, an 
assessment ought to be carried out. This is echoed by 
MacPhail and colleagues who assert the importance of 
recognising capacity as decision specific and that, there-
fore, patients with dementia (especially mild to mod-
erate) may well be able to meaningfully participate in 
decisions about their own care [14].
There appears to be strong support for some form of 
care planning as a means of involving patients in deci-
sions about their own care [14–19]. This is in part due 
to a recognition that a decline in a patient’s cognitive 
functioning may go unnoticed until a critical incident, at 
which point it is too late to involve them in the decision-
making process [14], but also that making decisions may 
prove less traumatic when the patient’s own wishes are 
known [15]. In a study by Scott and colleagues [20], sev-
eral nephrologists viewed advance care planning (ACP) 
as a way of avoiding the need for a best interests decision. 
However, other participants in the same study felt it inap-
propriate to always follow previously stated patient pref-
erences as it may be hard for patients to anticipate how 
they will feel about different treatment options ahead of 
time and the change in their health status may affect their 
preferences [20]. This was also highlighted by Conneen 
and colleagues [15]. Further, Clement and colleagues 
found that only 58% of French nephrologists partici-
pating in their study said they would be influenced by a 
patient’s refusal to initiate dialysis, and that the majority 
would not respect a patient’s request to discontinue dial-
ysis (whether of ‘sound mind’ or not) [21].
In anticipation of a patient being unable to make their 
own dialysis decision, Keating and colleagues note the 
importance of advance directives as a specific form of 
ACP, and argue that they should be respected as a reflec-
tion of patient wishes [17]. Similarly, Ang and colleagues 
raise the idea of Ulysses contracts8 as a means of captur-
ing patients’ earlier stated preferences in case their cog-
nition starts to decline [22]. However, DeCamp details 
8 A Ulysses contract, in this context, is a decision made by a person with 
decision-making capacity with the intention of binding that person to that 
decision in future. This is the principle applied to advance directives. The 
Ulysses contract is based on the story of Ulysses (Odysseus in the original 
Greek), whereby he foresaw irrational thoughts on approaching the Sirens so 
instructed his men to prevent him going to them regardless of his later actions 
and instructions.
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a case in which the patient had written a living will, but 
the terms used were so general as to be practically useless 
[23]. It is important, then, according to some, for there 
to be good communication between patients and sur-
rogate decision makers before the need for a decision to 
be made arises [16, 18]. Such communication, it is sug-
gested, should consider the preferences of the patient 
at different points in the progression of their illnesses 
to understand when they might change their view; this 
should also involve the surrogate decision maker devel-
oping an understanding of the reasons why the patient 
has the preferences they do so that they can better make 
decisions (consistent with those reasons) if faced with a 
scenario that had not been discussed [18]. Kaye and Lella 
go on to argue for the documentation of these discus-
sions, as well as regularly revisiting them [16]. MacPhail 
and colleagues also advocate for regular cognitive assess-
ments to allow impairment to be discovered quickly [14].
However, Kaye and Lella also suggest that it can be 
appropriate to set aside the known wishes of the patient 
when doing so may benefit the family, going as far as to 
suggest it is mandatory unless the patient is undoubtedly 
experiencing severe suffering [16]. This point is made 
in response to the particular case they discuss, in which 
the family later wrote to clinical staff explaining that on 
reflection they recognise that their insistence on keep-
ing their relative alive on dialysis was a result of them 
thinking of themselves. The family justified this, stating 
that they do not consider it wrong to have done so as ‘this 
helpless man was bringing out something good from all 
of us’ [16]. On this, Kaye and Lella also argue that the 
reverse can be true; if clinical staff and the family feel that 
the continuation of dialysis will cause unnecessary suffer-
ing, dialysis may be discontinued even if the patient had 
made clear that they wanted to continue [16]. This is an 
outlier insofar as it questions the underlying importance 
of the patient’s own preferences (which other scholars 
have deemed of great importance and to be followed if 
known [17]), and suggests that the interests of the family 
should be explicitly considered.9
It must be noted, however, that in practice patients 
may not be involved in decisions about their care to the 
degree that this literature suggests they should. Some 
papers noted that patients may be overlooked due to 
a perception that cognitive impairment precludes any 
informed decision making, in part because of the com-
plexity of dialysis [14, 20]. Indeed, McDougall discusses 
a specific patient and notes that she cannot be involved 
in the decision due to her dementia [24]. Scott and col-
leagues found there to be divided appreciation of ACP 
[20], which seems to again suggest exclusion rather than 
inclusion of patient views. On balance, this may be in 
part explained by the fact that a patient’s ACP may show 
that they do not want dialysis if they develop dementia 
but provide insufficient details to act on; in practice, the 
preferences of patients vary between mild, moderate, and 
advanced dementia, with many wanting to forego dialysis 
only in the event of advanced dementia [14].
Family dominance
A particularly prominent sub-theme is that of fam-
ily dominance in decision making. Whilst there is rec-
ognition that nephrologists are not obliged to provide 
treatment they consider inappropriate or excessively 
burdensome [13] and some nephrologists noted that 
they do not consider the family’s decisions to be of pri-
mary importance [25, 26], some of the included papers 
reported that a fear of complaints or litigation can lead 
nephrologists to agree to the demands of relatives even 
when they think them not to be in the patient’s best inter-
ests—so-called “defensive medicine” [12, 17, 22].10 Moss 
and colleagues found that 99% of dialysis unit medical 
directors surveyed would consult the family on care deci-
sions concerning a patient who develops dementia [27]. 
In one US case, the clinical team agreed to the demands 
of an insistent family after being advised to do so by the 
hospital’s legal team, because the family were substan-
tial donors to that hospital [28]. In another, the wishes of 
the patient were, in essence, overridden by his daughter; 
a 72-year-old male had received two kidney transplants 
and did not want to return to dialysis if the second failed, 
but when it did fail his daughter insisted and the patient 
finally agreed [13]. The line between persuasion and coer-
cion was not clear in this case, and whilst this particular 
example concerns a patient who was able to agree him-
self, it is still demonstrative of the dominance of family 
in dialysis decisions, and it is reasonable to assume that 
this would be more pronounced in cases of cognitively 
impaired patients.
This represents a clear disparity between generally 
accepted theory and practice. Theory tells us that the 
patient comes first and that decisions ought to reflect 
what is best for the patient, accounting for what the 
patient would likely have wanted. In practice, there is 
evidence that suggests this often does not happen. It is 
noteworthy, when considering family dominance in deci-
sion making, that there is evidence of families frequently 
failing to reflect the choices the patient would have 
made—generally being more in favour of life-sustaining 
9 The dominance of the family in decision making will be discussed shortly.
10 The issue of litigation was raised in the US context, with Feely and col-
leagues specifically noting a lesser tolerance for dangerous behaviour in the 
UK [12].
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treatment [17, 18]. MacPhail and colleagues also note 
that families mostly choose dialysis, but also that they 
often report being uninformed and unprepared to make 
these decisions [14].
Whilst some argue that family should be involved in 
decisions [22]—generally on the basis that they will rep-
resent the interests of the patient [17]—there are equally 
concerns that substituted judgement (which is used in 
many legal jurisdictions as a way of making these deci-
sions) may not be appropriate where the relative who is 
making the decisions would be the primary caregiver—
especially in countries where the carer burden is signifi-
cant [23]. Relatives may also be unsuitable proxies if they 
do not know the patient well [26]. This leads Keating and 
colleagues to argue that there is no moral authority for 
family to make medical decisions which do not reflect 
the patient’s wishes and, as such, nephrologists need not 
automatically comply with family decisions [17]—and 
this reflects the “best interests” system in England and 
Wales. Perkins similarly employs fiduciary principles to 
argue that the clinician is responsible for ensuring that 
any decision making adequately protects the interests of 
the cognitively impaired patient, which may mean mak-
ing a decision without the input of the patient’s relatives 
[26].
Notwithstanding those difficulties and differences, 
there is broad consensus across the included papers that 
the family ought to be afforded some role in the decision-
making process. Munoz Silva and Kjellstrand found there 
to be a trend in families taking a larger role in these deci-
sions over time (having charted such decisions in the 
US from 1970 to 1983) [29]. This is perhaps unsurpris-
ing at a time when medical paternalism was coming into 
question; where patient autonomy is not possible, vest-
ing the decision-making power in the family might be 
considered preferable to the judgement of the treating 
nephrologist.11
Arguably at one extreme, Kaye and Lella reason that 
where there is a ‘significant benefit to be gained by the 
family’—meaning some sort of solace or an opportunity 
for family members living far away to come and say good-
bye—it would be ‘mandatory’ to override the previously 
stated wishes of the patient and keep them on dialysis (p. 
78) [16]. Such a position places the interests of family on 
par with, or even above, those of the patient.
Others have advocated for positions that still generally 
favour the family being central in the decision-making 
process [15, 17, 30], but fall significantly short of giving 
preference to their interests.12 For example, O’Dowd and 
colleagues, reflecting on a case in which they had pre-
vented the brother of an incapacitated patient acting as 
proxy decision maker despite the patient having previ-
ously expressed such a preference, describe how they 
later came to regret that decision [30]. They concluded 
that it would have been ‘better to go with the nonstranger 
surrogate than for us, who are all strangers, to make the 
decision’ (p. 324) [30]. Consulting the family extensively 
is similarly valued by Keating and colleagues, though they 
remain strongly supportive of the position that doctors 
are not obligated to provide any treatment they do not 
consider appropriate, and that there is no moral authority 
for families to make decisions independent of either the 
patients’ wishes or best interests [17]. They do, however, 
strongly imply the family is a very powerful actor who 
they would not want to go against, preferring to trans-
fer a patient to another care provider13 rather than pro-
vide treatment against the family’s wishes. Before doing 
so, however, they advocate attempting to understand the 
reasons for the family’s position, as this may highlight 
an easily resolved misunderstanding and help find reso-
lution [17]. It is noteworthy that Keating and colleagues 
maintain this position, which implicitly accepts a sig-
nificant role for family, despite noting how studies have 
demonstrated that families frequently fail to reflect the 
choices the patient would have made [17].
Support for such a significant role for family is not, 
however, unanimous. McDougall writes:
‘Although there is generally a very important role for 
families in medical decision-making for incompe-
tent patients, this role should be highly sensitive to 
the specific details of the patient’s situation and the 
nature of the particular family involved’ (p. 45) [24].
This position arises out of the case discussed by McDou-
gall, in which she considers the view of the family to 
be wrong [24]. This led her to question the common 
assumption that the family ought to act as decision mak-
ers for patients with dementia, as the family’s under-
standing of the patient’s values becomes less important in 
the face of the patient’s loss of self.
Wider communication
Given the complexity of decisions concerning the initi-
ation of, or withdrawal from, dialysis, it is unsurprising 
12 Again, the differences between countries are highlighted here. All three of 
these studies originated in the US.
13 This study originated in the US, where the transfer of patients between 
providers is more common than in England and Wales.
11 It should be noted that such an approach is prevalent in the US but is less 
so in England and Wales. Certainly, families are consulted, but the practice of 
best interests is intended as an alternative given the shortcomings of substi-
tute decision making.
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that strong communication arose as a sub-theme. 
Good communication between all parties is stressed as 
important, but particularly the central triad of patient, 
family, and dialysis team [17, 22]. In communicating 
with families, Brennan and colleagues write, ‘[n]ephrol-
ogists should be bilingual; they should speak the plain 
language of their patients and the technical language 
of their discipline’ (p. 1006) [13]. This echoes the point 
made by Keating and colleagues that if a nephrologist 
does not feel that dialysis is appropriate they should 
seek to understand the reasons for families wanting 
continued treatment, as it may be based on a misunder-
standing [17].
Communication between professionals is also consid-
ered important [12, 16, 20–22, 28]. In their study, how-
ever, Scott and colleagues reported variation in how this 
was reflected in practice, with some interview partici-
pants reporting regular multidisciplinary best interests 
meetings whilst others reported situations in which the 
decision came down to what the consultant thought best 
[20]. Some suggest that the involvement of other neph-
rologists in consultations may be appropriate where 
disagreement arises that presents a challenge to shared 
decision making [12], and that a second opinion may 
even enable patient wishes to be understood more fully 
[21]. This is considered especially important by Ang and 
colleagues when the patient has multiple illnesses and is 
receiving care from doctors of other specialties [22].
Jones and McCullough discuss a particular case in 
which a vascular surgeon receives a patient referral to 
establish vascular access for dialysis but does not believe 
that it is in the best interests of the patient [28]. They 
argue it would be appropriate in such a scenario for the 
vascular surgeon to meet with the referring nephrologist 
to discuss the patient’s care and raise concerns [28]. For 
Kaye and Lella, the benefit of having input from other 
professionals, such as nurses and social workers, is the 
avoidance of a decision being made solely by the patient’s 
nephrologist [16]. The common thread here is the impor-
tance of seeking interprofessional agreement and the 
presumed benefit of reaching consensus from multi-
ple perspectives; it is considered preferable to involve a 
broad range of individuals with an interest in the patient’s 
care and have all parties on the same page regarding the 
care plan.
Some—notably those situated in the US—specifically 
discussed the potential role of clinical ethics committees/
consultation [12, 15, 17]. Feely and colleagues note that, 
in their experience, more difficult decisions about dialysis 
initiation tend to go to an ethics consultation, which they 
suggest is an appropriate course of action where there 
is no clear way forward [12]. Similarly, Conneen and 
colleagues consider ethics consultations a good way of 
discussing options in a non-adversarial and non-threat-
ening forum—they do, however, stress the importance of 
documenting deliberations [15].
What the literature demonstrates is some agreement 
that a collaborative approach is preferable to the subjec-
tive opinion of one nephrologist, and that good commu-
nication is essential to that.
Objectivity
Despite the value associated with shared decision making 
and the importance of individualised decisions, there is a 
clear concern in the included papers that both nephrolo-
gists and families may struggle to approach cases objec-
tively—which indicates that value is placed on objective 
decision making.
Validity of all care options
One sub-theme arising is the importance of all care 
options being presented in a broadly objective manner, 
accompanied by appropriate information, thereby allow-
ing the patient (or substitute decision maker, consultee 
etc.) to make an informed decision (or advise) without 
undue influence. Foote and colleagues found that some 
nephrologists dislike the phrase “recommend dialysis”, as 
a recommendation is not objective [25]. Some note the 
importance of maintaining a neutral balance by explain-
ing that CKM is not abandonment or opting out of treat-
ment, but is a valid choice [13, 14]. Beyond simply noting 
that all options are treatment, Spike suggests that neph-
rologists ought to reassure family that it is both legal and 
ethical to stop treatment that offers no hope of mean-
ingful recovery [19]. Spike also raises the possibility of 
enlisting the help of a local hospice to explain alternative 
options [19].
However, reports of practice in the literature do not 
align with this idea of the importance of objectivity. CKM 
is often not raised as an option for patients [13] and, 
argue Ying and colleagues, social expectations and other 
pressures have a tendency to lead to overdialysis [31]. A 
case discussed by Ang and colleagues involved a patient 
who was eventually persuaded to go for dialysis—the 
option the nephrologist thought best [22]—suggesting a 
lack of objectivity in how options were presented. Indeed, 
some nephrologists have been found to doubt the validity 
of patient refusals of treatment in the context of ESKD, 
assuming that a refusal is indicative of psychological 
problems [21].
There is also a risk of dominant clinician views prov-
ing problematic before a patient even reaches the point of 
dialysis discussion. Campbell and colleagues found that 
primary care providers were less likely to refer patients 
with old age and moderate dementia to a nephrolo-
gist, with 257/680 accounted for in the study not being 
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referred despite meeting the threshold for referral as per 
guidelines [32]. This suggests that the reported tendency 
of nephrologists towards dialysis (noted above) is not 
shared by primary care providers. Nonetheless, it appears 
that the line between professional advice (coupled with 
the objective provision of information) and coercion is an 
interesting one that might be somewhat blurred at times. 
As such, Foote and colleagues argue that nephrologists 
should promote objectivity and consistency by recogniz-
ing their treatment preferences and the factors underpin-
ning them [25].
Difficulties with family detachment
Family members—and indeed unrelated individuals who 
are close to patients and might be involved in care deci-
sions—have also been found to struggle with objectively 
assessing treatment options. Patients often prefer family 
members to provide input when making decisions [23]. 
However, as noted above, the assumption that the fam-
ily will decide in the best interests of the patient may not 
always be correct [15], and families have been found to 
make decisions more in their own interests than those 
of the patient [20]. For example, instances have been 
reported in the literature of carers preferring patients to 
receive in-centre haemodialysis as it gives them a rest a 
few times a week [20], and Spike noted a case in which 
the clinical team had concerns that a patient’s wife agreed 
to the withdrawal of dialysis only because she was fed up 
[33]. Scott and colleagues report a common belief among 
some nephrologists that families who want aggressive 
treatment do not fully appreciate the rigours of dialysis, 
and may be unwilling to accept mortality; some were 
reported to opine that some families harbour the unre-
alistic expectation that dialysis will cure all of their loved 
one’s issues [20].
Brennan and colleagues highlight that patients some-
times make decisions themselves (where they can) on 
the basis of the perceived needs and wants of their family 
[13], demonstrating the strength of family influence. Ang 
and colleagues suggest that it may be hard for family who 
are the main caregivers not to bring their own judgement 
into decisions when the caregiver burden and financial 
expenses are significant [22]. Seconding this, DeCamp 
asks whether substituted judgement will be pure when 
the deciding party is the primary caregiver [23]—argu-
ably there would always be some conflict of interest.
Cultural sensitivity
Another theme arising in the included papers is cultural 
sensitivity. This is particularly relevant given our earlier 
discussion of respecting patient autonomy, which does 
not hold the central importance everywhere that it does 
in Western cultures. As such, Davison and Holley suggest 
that ACP and other ‘autonomy respecting’ interventions 
may not be suitable if self-determination is not important 
within the patient’s culture [34].
In some cultures, the head of the family assumes the 
decision-making role [13] and atomistic autonomy is 
replaced by the idea of the relational self [34]. In a study 
comparing the role of advance directives between coun-
tries, Sehgal and colleagues found Japanese nephrologists 
to be far less willing to follow an advance directive when 
the patient’s family disagree with it; willingness of neph-
rologists to withdraw dialysis in line with an advance 
directive fell from 88% when the family agreed to 19% 
when the family disagreed [35]. Sehgal and colleagues 
posit a possible reason for this to be the greater emphasis 
on social relatedness in Japan as opposed to the notion 
of the autonomous self, going on to note that in Japan it 
is not uncommon for doctors and families to make care 
decisions on behalf of competent patients [35].
For patients whose culture requires the family to be 
responsible for care, peritoneal dialysis may be prefer-
able as it is an at-home option; Davison and Holley argue 
that it is important to consider cultural factors in decid-
ing on treatment modality [34]. However, it is highlighted 
as equally important that no assumptions are made, as 
patients may have blended cultural perspectives if they 
have moved from, for example, a non-Western country 
to a Western country [34]. Overall, then, there is a sug-
gestion that nephrologists ought to be culturally sen-
sitive and open to different values, whilst making no 
assumptions.
Medical versus non‑medical factors
No two patient cases are entirely alike, and myriad fac-
tors may contribute to a conclusion about the best course 
of action in any given situation. Many such factors are 
identified in the literature, ranging from family sup-
port to survival benefit. Of course, there is also complex 
interplay between these factors, and various trade-offs 
that might be considered. As noted by Clement and col-
leagues, decisions are often a risk–benefit assessment 
that accounts for both clinical (medical) and social fac-
tors (non-medical) [21].
Medical factors
The included literature clearly conveys the message that 
these decisions are not as simple as ESKD necessitating 
dialysis. The clinical status (including co-morbidities) of 
patients beyond kidney function is also relevant, and the 
presence of cognitive impairment itself is felt by some to 
be relevant to the dialysis decision.
In several of the included papers, it was shown that 
some participants and authors felt that the presence of 
cognitive impairment itself was justification for denying 
Page 11 of 17Parsons and Ives  BMC Med Ethics           (2021) 22:24  
dialysis [21, 25]. One participant clearly stated, ‘I don’t 
think severely demented patients should be dialysed’ (p. 
2307) [25]. Spike argues that when a patient has suffered 
a permanent loss of cognition, the presumption should 
move from the continuation of life-sustaining treatment 
to its withdrawal [19]. Davison and Holley are less cer-
tain, but suggest that profound neurological impairment 
might justify the foregoing of dialysis [34]. The reason-
ing behind this, suggest Conneen and colleagues, is that 
when a patient is cognitively impaired—dementia being 
the focus of their paper—dialysis no longer accomplishes 
the goal of permitting function as a human being, but 
instead prolongs the dying process [15]—a view echoed 
by Keating and colleagues [17]. However, Moss and col-
leagues found there to be little agreement among dialysis 
unit medical directors as to whether they would continue 
dialysis for a patient who develops dementia and has no 
advance directive [27].
The findings of Foote and colleagues demonstrate a 
higher likelihood of a patient being recommended for 
dialysis if they have preserved cognition [25], which was 
similarly found by Munoz Silva and Kjellstrand in the 
context of permanently unconscious patients [29]. In 
noting that evidence suggests a typical dementia patient 
will not get a survival benefit from dialysis, MacPhail 
and colleagues argue that an individual decision is nec-
essary [14]. They argue that this prevents generalisations 
impacting on care, as some patients with dementia may 
get a survival benefit. On individualised decisions for 
patients with both ESKD and dementia, Ying and col-
leagues also highlight that generic rules can result in 
socioeconomic disadvantage, as less educated patients 
are more likely to be diagnosed with dementia [31].14
Survival benefit is generally considered an impor-
tant factor. MacPhail and colleagues argue the need to 
consider illness trajectory, noting that older patients 
are likely to gain only negligible survival benefit [14]. A 
participant in a study by Foote and colleagues said that 
one of his general principles is ‘to avoid dialysis in the 
population > 80’ (p. 2307) [25]. The reason for this view 
is not made clear, though is likely attributable to consid-
eration around survival benefit. Clement and colleagues 
also found that prognosis was an important considera-
tion among participants in their study [21]. It is when 
survival benefit is limited, and the patient has multi-
morbidity—including dementia—that CKM is most 
frequently considered [20]. Davison and Holley also con-
sider comorbidities as particularly relevant, arguing that 
withholding dialysis may be appropriate if the patient has 
a non-renal terminal condition [34].
Clearly, the presence of comorbidities does impact 
on how beneficial dialysis can be, and there seems to be 
widespread support for comorbidities being relevant to 
dialysis initiation decisions. However, there appears to 
be disagreement about how influential comorbidities 
ought to be, and whether cognitive impairment in par-
ticular is an appropriate candidate for a blanket exclusion 
criterion.
Non‑medical factors
As important as medical factors appear to be in decisions, 
the literature also demonstrates a consistent appreciation 
of non-medical factors. Quality of life is widely consid-
ered relevant to dialysis initiation decisions [12, 14, 19–
21, 24, 25], which reflects an acknowledgement of how 
burdensome dialysis can be. Foote and colleagues found 
that nephrologists, when making recommendations for 
dialysis, were willing to forego 12 months of survival if it 
would avoid a significant decrease in the patient’s quality 
of life [25]. However, others highlight how an attitude of 
“treat what you can” sometimes results in the continua-
tion of treatment despite, for example, severe frailty [12]. 
Nonetheless, in considering quality of life, MacPhail and 
colleagues argue that it should be routinely evaluated; the 
current focus on efficacy in clinical reviews is, they sug-
gest, too narrow [14].
If quality of life is an important factor, the question of 
how it should be measured and accounted for becomes 
important. Some appear to automatically associate cog-
nitive impairment with low quality of life. Spike, for 
example, suggests that those with advanced dementia or 
a severe and irreversible brain injury get no benefit from 
dialysis as they are no longer capable of enjoying life [19]. 
Some participants in Scott and colleagues’ study ques-
tioned whether patients with cognitive impairment have 
sufficient quality of life, especially if they are bed bound 
and have to attend dialysis sessions on a stretcher [20]. 
Along similar lines, Kaye and Lella focus on a distinc-
tion between biological life and a ‘higher variant’ which 
is specifically human; ‘‘life’ in the body (i.e. respiration, 
heart beat, excretion) permanently without awareness, 
or a minimal ability to relate to other people, is life with-
out the essence of humanity’ (p. 77) [16]. To keep such a 
patient on dialysis is, they argue, to prolong dying rather 
than life, which is ‘morally unsound’ [16]. However, 
MacPhail and colleagues note that quality of life can be 
very similar for patients on dialysis and those undergo-
ing CKM, with the main difference being that dialysis 
patients generally spend more time in hospital and are 
therefore more likely to die there [14]. This is important 
to consider as whilst quality of life may be comparable 
14 They note that tests of cognitive ability look for signs that more educated 
individuals are more likely to demonstrate.
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more generally between dialysis and CKM, some patients 
will much prefer to minimise time spent at hospital; in 
particular, some will not want to die there.
When considering quality of life, it is usually impor-
tant to engage with the patient to ascertain their own 
views. However, acknowledging the challenges of involv-
ing cognitively impaired patients (specifically those with 
dementia) in decisions about their own care—as we have 
discussed above—McDougall suggests one approach may 
be to consider the interests and preferences of demen-
tia patients generally [24]. Patients living with dementia 
will not necessarily experience life on dialysis to be of low 
quality, for example.
There is little support in the literature reviewed 
for consideration of resources in dialysis decisions. 
Spike does consider dialyzing permanently cognitively 
impaired patients a violation of the responsibility to use 
resources wisely [19], though this view is unique among 
the papers  included. Further, Spike acknowledges that 
those with less severe dementia sometimes appear happy, 
so it may not be easy to draw the line [19]. Cady dis-
cusses a hypothetical case in which the renal team cite 
significant use of resources as a reason for not wanting 
the patient to initiate dialysis, though they still appeal 
primarily to questions of harm and benefit to the individ-
ual patient [36]. She goes on to argue that the distributive 
justice argument is ‘weak at best’ as such an approach 
at the patient level ‘undermines the integrity and vio-
lates the trust inherent in the physician–patient and/or 
nurse-patient relationship’ (p. 126) [36]. Conneen and 
colleagues reject a utilitarian approach to resource allo-
cation in favour of individual best interests [15]. Further, 
both McDougall and Kaye and Lella argue that nephrolo-
gists should ignore wider issues of cost and resource allo-
cation when making decisions for individual patients [16, 
24].
The importance of support outside of the clinical set-
ting was highlighted in some papers. Several studies dis-
cussed the importance of support systems, with Foote 
and colleagues noting the importance of family inclina-
tion towards dialysis [25]. Scott and colleagues found that 
some nephrologists even consider family support to be 
more important to the success of dialysis than age or clin-
ical condition [20]. Of note, however, they highlight that 
support is also important to the success of CKM [20]. 
The extent to which support networks might factor into 
the decision between dialysis and CKM is, then, not clear.
Nonetheless, O’Rourke and colleagues argue that it 
is appropriate to account for carer burden, including 
both actual and opportunity costs [37]. This is interest-
ing given our earlier discussion of family dominance 
in decisions, with relatives sometimes found to have 
agreed to the patient foregoing dialysis as it would be 
too burdensome for those relatives. However, equally, 
we highlighted those who chose to keep a patient alive 
for their own benefit, something which both Keating and 
colleagues and McDougall consider inappropriate. Both 
argue that subjecting a patient to dialysis in order to pro-
vide an emotional benefit to the family is unacceptable 
[17, 24], with Keating and colleagues making a Kantian 
argument that to do so would be treating that patient as a 
means to an end [17].
A final non-medical factor that was commonly dis-
cussed was patient nonadherence. As this was particu-
larly dominant in the papers, we have decided to discuss 
it separately in the next section.
Managing nonadherent patients
There is widespread recognition that nephrologists are 
under no obligation to provide dialysis where they con-
sider it inappropriate or excessively burdensome [13, 14, 
19]. Spike notes the importance of being willing to with-
draw treatment when it is no longer beneficial [19]. One 
possible reason for withdrawing (or, indeed, withholding) 
care is nonadherence.
As dialysis (specifically in-centre haemodialysis) 
requires the patient to sit still for an extended period, 
when a patient becomes agitated and tries to remove 
needles there is a risk of harm not only to the patient 
but to anyone else present. In such situations, the option 
of restraining the patient for the duration of treatment 
might be considered. O’Dowd and colleagues present a 
US case in which a patient with fluctuating capacity was 
dialyzed against his will whilst the care team awaited a 
court decision about whether continued dialysis was in 
his best interests [30]. The court later authorised the hos-
pital to take all measures necessary to provide treatment, 
including sedation [30]. The following passage describes 
the resulting situation:
‘We ended up deciding that he would be treated 
against his will which at times involved dragging a 
kicking, screaming, hitting person, who may have 
been HIV+, down to dialysis, strapping him down 
for 4 hours, putting needles in his arms, and dialyz-
ing him. The dialysis staff was not happy about this 
and it wasn’t clear that it was the best thing or the 
right thing to do’ (p. 322) [30].
In this case the staff were uncomfortable with the situ-
ation and were undecided whether dialysis under physi-
cal restraint was best for the patient. In another case 
(this one in England and Wales), discussed by Grubb, the 
clinical team sought a declaration from the court that it 
was in the best interests of a patient who lacked decision-
making capacity, and was uncooperative, to not impose 
haemodialysis [38]. The court agreed, which the author 
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suggests could be because the judge did not consider the 
regular use of a high degree of force to be in a patient’s 
best interests. Feely and colleagues also consider a case 
of a violently resistant patient who, when not on dialysis, 
clearly expressed a desire to continue with therapy [12]. 
The clinical team was unsure of the best way to proceed 
in terms of respecting the patient’s autonomy and ensur-
ing the safety of both the patient and those around him 
[12]. McDougall notes that a patient removing needles 
several times during treatment is a clear sign of distress 
[24]—the implication being that distress is contrary to 
their interests.
Ying and colleagues argue that where a patient is agi-
tated and restraint becomes necessary to perform dialy-
sis, the restraint should be taken as an additional harm 
to be considered in the benefit/burden analysis [31]. In 
addition, Feely and colleagues suggest it is appropriate to 
consider the safety of others in these situations, and that 
discontinuation of dialysis can be justified if the risks to 
others cannot be mitigated [12]. Further, in the context 
of dialysis trials, Scott and colleagues found that some 
nephrologists consider that where patient behaviour puts 
someone at risk it would be appropriate to cease that 
trial [20]. MacPhail and colleagues note that coopera-
tion is generally considered a prerequisite for dialysis in 
many guidelines, which becomes relevant with dementia 
patients as an outpatient dialysis centre is not a dementia 
friendly environment [14]. Whereas the aforementioned 
scholars do not go as far as to suggest an automatic ruling 
out of dialysis where restraint is necessary, Spike does, 
making the case that the need for restraint is prima facie 
evidence that dialysis is no longer justified [19]. Further, 
in an earlier paper, Spike  discussed a wife who was more 
strongly in favour of discontinuing her husband’s dialy-
sis when she found out he would have to be sedated for 
every session [33].
It may be that freedom from restraint is more highly 
valued than the life extension dialysis affords, from the 
perspectives of both nephrologists and those close to 
patients. That being the case, to forcibly dialyze a patient 
who is severely uncooperative might usually be deemed 
not to be in their best interests.
Substituted judgement
Demonstrative of the strong representation of the US 
context in the literature, there is significant discussion of 
substituted judgement. There is also some (albeit negligi-
ble) discussion of an alternative best interests approach—
though it should be noted that such discussions are not 
necessarily of “best interests” in the context of the MCA 
2005, but best interests as an ethical principle. Nonethe-
less, substituted judgement was the far more dominant 
theme.
There is certainly evidence of support for the view 
that, when making a treatment decision for patients 
lacking capacity, families have a duty to replicate as far 
as possible the choice that the patient would have made 
themselves [15, 17]—this is substituted judgement. 
However, there is disagreement over whether substi-
tuted decisions are made properly. It is highlighted 
by some that surrogate decision makers frequently 
fail to predict patient preferences correctly [23], and 
argued that this can undermine the principle of respect 
for autonomy that underpins substituted judgement 
approaches [18]. In contrast, Munoz Silva and Kjell-
strand suggest that substituted judgement is generally 
used wisely, as they found little difference between 
patients who chose to stop dialysis themselves and 
those who had the decision to stop made for them by 
another in terms of type of, site of, and time on dialysis 
[29]. Regardless of whether one considers substituted 
judgement appropriate, Cady highlights that it may not 
be reliable because the people to whom the decision 
would fall may decline to make decisions on behalf of 
the patient [36].
For substituted judgement to work, McDougall argues 
that the patient at the time of the decision must be 
understood to be the same as the patient known by the 
surrogate decision maker [24]. Patients with demen-
tia, however, suffer ‘discontinuity of self ’, so McDougall 
argues that appropriateness of substituted judgement 
ought to be questioned—especially where the previous 
and current interests of the patient conflict [24]. Even 
without this discontinuity, Perkins suggests that a relative 
acting as a substitute decision maker may be unsuitable 
in that role if they do not know the patient well [26].
The importance of individualised decisions is also 
stressed. MacPhail and colleagues call for this individu-
alised approach in the context of dementia patients to 
avoid the provision of inappropriate treatments, noting 
the importance of early, patient-centred discussion of 
treatment options [14], but their point can certainly be 
expanded to include any cognitive impairment. In par-
ticular, those with fluctuating capacity would stand to 
benefit, as they are not always unable to make their own 
care decisions [38].
Whilst it is not widely discussed, a distinction is drawn 
in the literature between substituted judgement and 
best interests [22]. McDougall highlights criticism of the 
patient-focused nature of the best interests approach, 
as it does not consider morally relevant burden to oth-
ers [24]. Even if a patient-focused approach is taken, 
MacPhail and colleagues argue the need to regularly 
revisit decisions, as what is initially appropriate may 
become unacceptably burdensome as the patient’s cog-
nitive impairment (dementia is the focus in this paper) 
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progresses [14]. Perkins also seems to touch on the idea 
of best interests, albeit without labelling it as such, when 
he notes that ‘[t]he physicians and nurses should inter-
view his [a hypothetical patient] niece, neighbors, bowl-
ing teammates, and friends from the senior citizens’ 
center to learn about Mr. B’s life style, joys, and previ-
ously expressed wishes about medical care’ (p. 131) [26].
Substituted judgement is very clearly the main focus of 
the literature. Very little attention is paid to the alterna-
tive of best interests in the context of dialysis decisions. 
This is not entirely surprising as the majority of the lit-
erature is written in the US context, and it spans more 
than three decades. Nonetheless, shortcomings of both 
approaches are highlighted.
Discussion
This scoping review has brought together a range of 
arguments and evidence pertaining to dialysis decisions 
made with, for, and on behalf of cognitively impaired 
adults with or approaching ESKD. What is hugely appar-
ent from the literature is that there is little consensus on 
any aspect of this topic. In part, this can be attributed to 
the range of jurisdictions and years covered—it is to be 
expected that there will be differences across borders and 
that ideas will change over time.
Whilst patients are at the centre of these decisions, 
there are many other stakeholders with arguably legiti-
mate interests who would like to, do, and often should 
contribute to the decision-making process. However, 
accommodating all legitimate interests is a difficult bal-
ancing act. Families are highlighted as often being domi-
nant in these decisions, which is problematic in several 
ways. It should be noted that the way families are por-
trayed may not be a fair reflection of all families in these 
scenarios, but it remains that this idea of dominance is 
clearly highlighted in the included papers. First, it is sug-
gested that families often fail to accurately represent 
the patient’s views and preferences, whether intention-
ally or not [17, 18]. Families also tend to favour dialysis 
in almost all situations, generally viewing it as a default 
“safe” option [17, 18]. Sometimes, families may choose 
to keep the patient alive because doing so is in their 
own interests (such as wanting to spend more time with 
them), which is supported by some of the literature [16]. 
This seems to be based on the consequentialist argument 
that everyone’s interests matter equally, and so there 
should be no default assumption that the interests of the 
patient outweigh those of affected relatives. Family deci-
sion makers may also have unrealistic expectations of 
what dialysis can do for their relative in terms of curing 
several ills. The role of the family does vary across juris-
dictions, and (in this review) appears most significant in 
the US, which some have suggested is the result of a more 
litigious and money-oriented health care system [12, 17, 
22]. The literature included in this review represents a 
range of jurisdictions (as detailed earlier in this paper), 
and the significance placed on the family in decisions 
in the US is not necessarily a legal issue, but the ethical 
concerns raised about it are clear. Regardless of any merit 
one sees in this approach, it is not in keeping with the 
requirements of the England and Wales’ MCA 2005; the 
MCA 2005 Code of Practice is clear that what the fam-
ily wants is not relevant to a best interests decision [39]. 
Of note, none of the studies highlighting family domi-
nance in decisions originated in the UK. Excluding those 
that were published prior to the enactment of the MCA 
2005, one possible explanation for this is that the law is 
being well applied and that the role of the family is being 
limited to reporting the patient’s views and preferences. 
Another possible explanation is that the kind of research 
that could expose family dominance in these decisions 
is not being done in the UK, or that participants in such 
studies are aware of how they should and should not pre-
sent accounts of decision making to be consistent with 
the law. Further research is needed on this.
Cultural variation is also highlighted as a potential rea-
son for dominant involvement of the family. The impor-
tance of autonomy is a heavily Western perspective, and 
some cultures favour less individualistic approaches to 
care decisions [13, 34]. This raises important questions 
about how clinicians should navigate complex deci-
sions about medical treatment with, for, and on behalf 
of patients without decision-making capacity when 
such patients are from cultural backgrounds that value 
autonomy differently and have different expectations 
and norms about the role of family in decision making. 
The particular risk is that we make wrong assumptions 
about what a cognitively impaired person would want, 
based solely on their apparent cultural background. 
Whether clinicians make cultural assumptions or consult 
those close to the patient to ascertain pertinent cultural 
values, a further challenge may arise in simultaneously 
navigating these cultural values and the requirements of 
legislation. Considering two different countries where 
autonomy is generally highly valued, this may be more 
straightforward in the US, for example, where (for what-
ever reason) overt family involvement (ne dominance) 
appears more usual, but in England and Wales (in the 
context of the MCA 2005), even if it is apparent that the 
patient lacking decision-making capacity holds values 
that clearly point to the family as favoured decision mak-
ers, the law still does not permit the family to act as sur-
rogate decision makers in the absence of a formal proxy 
appointment. Thus, when the patient’s perceived prefer-
ences (which the MCA 2005 says must be considered) do 
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not align with the Act’s assignment of decision-making 
roles, it becomes very difficult to be sensitive to this par-
ticular aspect of cultural difference. There was limited 
discussion of the complexities of cultural sensitivity in 
the literature, but this is an important point to consider 
in a scenario where the family are looked to as represent-
atives of the patient’s own views and preferences.
Overall, it is clear from the literature that families—or, 
more accurately, those close to the patient—tend to play 
a significant role in the decision-making process. How-
ever, whilst this clinical reality is somewhat reflected in 
theoretical stances, there is a disconnect. Arguments as 
to how decisions should be made tend to favour a more 
balanced approach whereby a nephrologist can justifiably 
question the input of a family and decline to proceed with 
its choice when, from the perspective of the nephrologist, 
that choice is not in the best interests of the patient. This 
supports the MCA 2005′s creation of the consultee role, 
even if decisions are not always made this way in practice.
Whilst family dominance appears common, there is 
recognition of the importance of other perspectives. In 
particular, given how common comorbidities are in the 
ESKD population, the importance of inter-specialty com-
munication is raised [12, 16, 20–22, 28]. As individu-
als beyond the renal team will often be involved in the 
care of a patient with ESKD, there is a suggestion that a 
decision is better if some sort of consensus is reached. 
However, according to the literature, this is not always 
the case in practice [20]. Whilst some clinicians were 
reported in empirical studies to consider it important to 
present care options objectively and avoid undue influ-
ence [25], in several cases nephrologists appear to doubt 
patient refusals and consider them indicative of psy-
chological problems [21]. Those in the latter category 
may consider it acceptable not to take these refusals as 
informed, autonomous refusals and therefore act pater-
nalistically. In the context of the best interests approach 
in England and Wales, to treat a patient as lacking deci-
sion-making solely on the basis that their decision is not 
perceived by the clinician as “good”, “right”, or “wise” is 
contrary to section 1(4) of the MCA 2005 which protects 
the right of patients to make “unwise” decisions.
A final, and important, related point is that the lit-
erature considers ways of avoiding the need for these 
decisions in the first place. Various forms of ACP are 
highlighted as a way of respecting the patient’s own 
wishes [14–19], thereby avoiding potential family domi-
nance and/or paternalism. However, discussion of the 
pitfalls of such approaches also arises [23]. On a practi-
cal note, there is the importance of the level of detail in 
advance discussions. With dementia, for example, the 
care preferences of a patient can realistically be expected 
to be different depending on whether they have mild, 
moderate, or severe dementia. Distinguishing between 
these as part of ACP can be challenging, first because 
the gaps between mild and moderate and moderate 
and severe may be difficult grasp in advance, and sec-
ond because ACPs may not contain the necessary level 
of specificity. Going beyond a discussion of care prefer-
ences in the abstract, and considering the patient’s views 
on treatment in very specific scenarios, can help avoid 
situations in which recorded patient wishes in relation to 
future contexts are unclear, but to do so effectively would 
require such detail so as to be hugely cumbersome. That 
is before one accounts for the need to keep such plans up 
to date, and the difficulties raised by the problem of the 
discontinuous self.
It is perhaps unsurprising that the literature devotes a 
good deal of space to quality of life, and how it does and 
ought to factor in decisions about dialysis. This arose in 
many papers [12, 14, 19–21, 25], though different posi-
tions were taken. Whilst some favoured quality of life 
over quantity (to an extent) [25], others highlighted the 
presence of a “treat what you can” attitude [12]. Of par-
ticular interest, some suggested that cognitive impair-
ment entails a compromised quality of life [16, 19, 20]. 
Whilst this will certainly be the case for some, it would 
be wrong to suggest that all cognitively impaired individ-
uals suffer a reduced quality of life or that any reduction 
in quality on that basis means life is no longer of value. 
The broad consensus in the literature—to consider the 
impact on the individual patient rather than make blan-
ket judgements—suggests a broad acceptance of the need 
to respect autonomy, avoid assumptions, and adopt a 
patient-centred approach to these decisions.
A further theme we particularly want to highlight is non-
adherence. Even if dialysis appears to be clearly in the best 
interests of a patient, resistance in various forms presents 
an obstacle to care provision. When a patient is nonad-
herent, there are risks not only to the patient but to those 
around them—Hashmi and Moss list examples such as 
physical abuse and requiring unscheduled extra treatments 
due to treatment nonadherence [40]. Restraint might seem 
an obvious remedy, but this is not a course of action to be 
taken lightly. In one case discussed above, there was regret 
among the clinical team when a patient was restrained for 
the purposes of dialysis [30]. There may be a risk of moral 
distress if clinicians are expected to restrain a patient for 
dialysis but consider it inappropriate, especially if the 
restraint is court  ordered. Whilst some have suggested 
cooperation to be a prerequisite of dialysis [14, 19], others 
are more sympathetic to at least some level of restraint [12, 
38]. The extent to which the need for restraint should be 
factored into dialysis decisions is a moot point in the lit-
erature and is complex and often uncomfortable—perhaps 
because it captures so dramatically the tension between 
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our aversion to coercion and our desire to protect people 
we see as vulnerable. Given that our aversion to coercion 
is generally based on acceptance of the importance of 
respecting autonomy, it may be worth considering whether 
the discomfort with constraint comes from latent (but 
perhaps misplaced) feelings that the cognitively impaired 
patient still has autonomy (which is insulted by coercion) 
or whether it exposes our concern that the patient still 
has a right to autonomy that we are consciously or erro-
neously failing to respect. Whichever—if either—it is, it 
seems reasonable that the nature of the necessary restraint 
might affect the extent to which it is considered acceptable 
or ethically permissible, as well as the frequency and dura-
tion of restraint necessitated by the particular patient’s 
nonadherence.
Especially pertinent to the wider project of which this 
scoping review is a part is the discussion of the respec-
tive merits of the best interests and substituted judge-
ment approaches—notably, that the former is mentioned 
very little. Some suggest that patient preferences should 
be the sole guiding force in dialysis decisions [15, 17], but 
this is problematised by evidence that surrogate decisions 
often poorly predict patient preferences [23]. This is, as 
some acknowledge, in part related to the important dis-
tinction that can be made between the patient known by 
the surrogate decision maker and the patient as they are 
at the time of the decision [24]. The two are not necessar-
ily the same and may be hugely different in terms of how 
they would view the initiation of dialysis. Perhaps, then, 
substituted judgement is only appropriate when the two 
align, but this raises the complex matter of determining 
whether they do. The difficulty of this might be taken to 
suggest that the best interests approach is preferable as it 
aims not to make the decision the patient would actually 
make, but the best decision that the patient could make. 
However, this is differently complex and raises challeng-
ing questions about the extent to which best interests 
decisions are intended to track autonomy, act paternal-
istically, or track some kind of supposed ideal preference. 
Either way, this review has highlighted a gap in the litera-
ture around best interests decisions as described in the 
MCA and maintenance dialysis.
Limitations
We acknowledge the potential for bias in this study but 
accept that this kind of research is always subject to per-
sonal interpretation of the material. We sought to mini-
mise bias from JAP’s interpretation by another author 
(JI) reviewing eligibility decisions and analysis through-
out and maintaining a questioning and reflexive attitude 
towards the themes being developed.
The choice of databases aimed at capturing as much 
relevant literature as possible. Nonetheless, it may be that 
some has been missed. Further, by limiting our search to 
these databases we did not include relevant professional 
guidance. Nonetheless, such guidance is more akin to the 
“rules” at work and might not be reflective of the realities 
of clinical practice, so its inclusion would have necessi-
tated a shift in focus.
This review is exploratory and does not seek to pro-
vide a definitive overview, nor does it seek to answer the 
normative questions that it foregrounds. As such, even 
accounting for these limitations, this review provides 
a foundation from which future research concerning 
the provision of dialysis for cognitively impaired adult 
patients can build.
Conclusions
What this scoping review has demonstrated is that there 
is significant variation in both the practice and theory of 
dialysis decision making with, for, and on behalf of cog-
nitively impaired  adult patients. Decisions made with, 
for, and on behalf of patients who lack decision-making 
capacity are almost always challenging but can be more 
so when care options are as cumbersome as dialysis. 
Complexity arises in considering who should get a say, 
how influential their say should be in a decision, and 
what factors are most relevant to the decision.
This scoping review provides a useful groundwork 
from which further research can be undertaken, and has 
highlighted a dearth of literature looking at best interests 
decisions and dialysis (as per the MCA) and empirical 
research on these decisions in the UK (and outside of the 
US generally). This future research might have increasing 
importance in the era of COVID-19, given the pandem-
ic’s real and potential impact on both kidney care [41] 
and decision making for the cognitively impaired [42].
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